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Le petit nombre qui restait demeurait bien faible pour subvenir aux besoins scolaires de toutes les villes et encore moins de tous les villages de France. De plus, le chaos politique dans lequel vivait la France empirait la situation. Un homme d'affaires genevois, Henry Dunant , fut l'un des fondateurs de la Croix-Rouge internationale Arnault Dudevant :. Nous n'avons plus de provinces, et nous avons encore environ trente patois qui en rappellent les noms. Ce fut la politique soumise au principe de la fin justifiant les moyens.

Rien ne sauroit justifier un semblable abus.

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Article 1 er 1. Exemple de mots 1. The common liberty of all actors in the international arena is a bulwark against top-down descending unification. Bottom-up legitimated notions of justice and law resurface when we analyse primary sources in detail. Pragmatic political discourse and normative legal discourse are constantly cross-disseminated. International relations are not legal at an instant and political at another, but bear the same, mixed taint at every instance. Europe was but one of the international theatres for global powers. Consequently, agreements on armament reductions or nuclear non-proliferation were decided by the two superpowers, and were a sign that the other sovereign nations were out of the game.

France 1 or China 2 , permanent members of the big power club, did not accept this. The Federal Republic of Germany, on the other hand, could not afford to oppose such a text, and had to accede to the instrument 17 August The European management system of international affairs seemed to have utterly failed, perceived as the result of centuries of war, occasionally interrupted by balance-of-power diplomacy 4 , or channelled into colonial expansion 5.

Public opinion was more and more averse to military confrontation 6 and the former European possessions or protectorates on other continents made an appeal to popular sovereignty and self-determination. Moreover, as the Cold War set in from on, Europe was divided according to the lines of occupation at the end of the Second World War. International organisations around the two antagonist superpowers followed. However, a full integration of the national and international legal orders, and the development of supranational institutions, capable to ensure legal protection to the individual 11 , was limited to the European continent only.

At the level of world politics, realism in political science could go together with a realist approach to international law International community, however, was reserved to the prophet Charles de Gaulle, 10 September The principles governing the functioning of these bodies required a high degree of abstraction, a corollary of the need for general consent Consequently, the emphasis on sovereignty, equality and state consent, three cardinal factors in the classical European law of nations, was preponderant The Security Council, composed of five permanent members, could patrol the world, but only in case of unanimity between these very members who were all parties to the Cold War.

The USSR argued from a strict theory of sovereignty and non-intervention. The UN system was seen as legitimate, since it represented all states on an equal basis. Yet, at a regional level, international organisations were classified as either socialist or Imperialistic, and seen as vehicles in an ideological battle.

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However, the general customary principle of non-intervention did not apply in Eastern Europe, where the USSR crushed dissidence in Hungary or Czechoslovakia , thanks to a supposed regional custom permitting intervention whereas it had been outlawed for the rest of the world, as an application of the lex specialis -principle If an attack means total destruction, any armed attack becomes highly improbable States with proper means of nuclear deterrence, and thus less dependent on the two superpowers, could therein act with relatively greater freedom. European defence was organized against the aggressor of the past war, as the Treaty on the Western European Union explicitly stated It took until for the NATO-treaty to be signed For the Russian-led bloc, only the UN-organs had legitimacy to act on the international stage Defeated on 8 may , its sovereignty was not restored until the German unification took force on 15 March The partitioned former Third Reich capital Berlin, under a four party-regime of the former wartime allies, or the modification of the Eastern border to compensate Poland a quarter of pre-wartime German national territory 42 could count as symbols of this uneasy situation.

The Federal Republic claimed to represent the former German state in its 31 December borders, well until the end of the s As well West as East Germany started from a handicapped position on the international level. The Federal Republic had to renounce the production or use of atomic, biological or chemical weapons There again, even if the financial or industrial capabilities would have been present, Germany would have to fight a diplomatic battle without end to build nuclear weapons itself, as Britain and France could do freely.

Moreover, West German diplomacy had to get its international partners to abstain from any recognition of the DDR. The so-called Hallstein-doctrine implied that West Germany posed the non-recognition of East Germany as a precondition in diplomatic affairs Michel Gaudet, Resistance to the theory of supranationalism came both from national public law 50 and public international law. State sovereignty was unlimited, save for explicit limitations agreed to by the states themselves Looked at from a distance of half a century, the emergence of key concepts as primacy or direct effect of European law seems evident Yet, the opposition we will describe in the next part B between the French political discourse, on one hand, and the vertical integration of the Atlantic world, on the other hand, was not merely one between politics and the legal professions The former saw the treaties creating three European communities as a coincidental whole of four separate international instruments, organising coexistence between states The traditional internationalist conception saw European community law as a political law, whereby political agreements between equal and sovereign partners continued as the sole source of law.

Yet, Institutional 59 discourse, produced by the organs created by the treaties, saw the judge, and in the case of competition, the administration, as law creators themselves. This, in turn, had as a consequence that transnational economic activity would create an ever closer union de facto , whereas the traditional conception saw this as the mission of politicians and high government officials within each state.

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Finally, unification through the renvoi -procedure of art. Traditionally, normative indeterminacy or: the vagueness of treaty clauses agreed between states provided diplomats and their legal advisers with a mandate to elaborate a hybrid politico-legal discourse.

The European integration process, however, delegated this function to the court Conversation de Gaulle-Breznjev, 21 juin Conversation de Gaulle-Kiesinger, 14 January This rendered France suspect in the eyes of Stalin and Vyshinsky Soviet nuclear weapons could attain American territory thanks to the development of long-range-bombers.

Consequently, Europe had to turn to other solutions for an effective and certain protection. The failure of the European Defence Community, the initiative designed to pool the standing armies of France, Britain and Germany into a supranational force, was attributed to his opposition In opposition for the whole of the Fourth Republic 87 , de Gaulle had attacked the Treaties of Rome establishing the EEC and Euratom, concluded in March 88 , barely a month and a half before his return to power.

He saw the Common Market as essential to European organisation, since it allowed for the controlled development of West Germany Irrespective of the factual failure of his political designs, the French President obtained the supranational organization of the Common Agricultural Policy With the other continental powers no longer as competitors, it could look for a new partnership. Directly afterwards, de Gaulle went to Mexico March.


A year and a half after the beginning of systematic US bombardments in the French former colony Vietnam 98 , de Gaulle castigated the aggressive policy of the hegemon in his Pnom Penh discourse 30 August Whereas the United States had criticized the Anglo-French intervention in Suez or the Algerian War, de Gaulle projected the image of an Imperialist state on a nation confident on its historical credentials as the first post-colonial state Couve de Murville, 7 July The three countries had teamed up in to jointly produce nuclear weapons, confirmed by a co-financing agreement on an isotope separation machine at Pierrelatte France This last step meant that France would render the other Western European partners dependent on her, and at the same time obtain a joint veto with Britain on the use of American force Britain, in the meanwhile, had turned away from France, signing a bilateral agreement at the Bahamas-summit late British-American separate meetings had irritated Konrad Adenauer as well Yet, from a German perspective, the French plans were ambivalent.

On one hand, they could provide an alternative to complete dependence on American force , as the United States were shifting their priorities to Asia Yet, on the other hand, they might give the USSR the impression of a divided —and thus vulnerable- Western bloc, and lure the United States into isolationism This implied that the United States would determine in which circumstances the USSR would sufficiently have altered the balance of power between the two blocs, to use nuclear firepower. Anything below this threshold would remain in the realm of conventional defence.

Consequently, the European allies would have more to say, if they drove up the number of their own forces , diminishing the financial burden for the United States Logically, Adenauer turned to de Gaulle, albeit in a balancing act between Washington and Paris. The Chancellor relied on American diplomats and politicians active in the preceding decade , with whom he had built a relation of confidence, e.

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Conversely, de Gaulle never questioned the fundamental Franco-American alliance From the beginning on, the question of political union was intertwined with that of British accession. Britain had stayed out of the ECSC in , both since it had important commercial relations with the Commonwealth-countries, and because it preferred the transformation of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation to a genuine pan-European free trade zone Both the Benelux countries and Germany were in favour of a narrow cooperation with a prospective new big member state, which would serve to balance French influence.

Two organs would be necessary: a Council, consisting of the heads of state and government and ministers for foreign affairs , seconded by an administrative Secretariat. De Gaulle opposed the latter institution, since it suggested a taint of supranationality In other words, whereas the proponents of economic integration saw the fusion of the sui generis institutions of the three Communities as the spearhead of European Union, the French tried to proceed the other way round.

Council of Ministers, Commission and Parliamentary Assembly would first be subjected to the intergovernmental Council, to be merged in an ulterior phase The primacy of the intergovernmental modus operandi had considerable consequences.

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In essence, France and Germany tried to avoid a formal, individual veto by the smaller member states, but, instead, tried to retain an implicit joint veto by the major powers Consequently, Britain could adhere to the EEC, if the Political Union would have taken over the bulk of the integration process, to possibly find the door of the main organ, the new intergovernmental international organisation, shut The central role of law in the European integration process through the Court consequently risked to be reined in, as the Luxemburg judges would not have competence over the structures responding directly to the organs of the European Political Union By contrast, sensitive issues as agriculture, coal and steel, textiles or voting rights in the Council of Ministers would provide substantial negotiation issues Yet, even if the Netherlands and West Germany abandoned their initial precondition about British EEC-membership , the institutional aspects of the French proposal inevitably backfired