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Ein Kampf zweier Welten. Kant-Studien , 6 : Leipzig: K. Berlin: de Gruyter. Eucken, Walter. Die geistige Krise und der Kapitalismus. Religion und Sozialismus. Eine Fortsetzung der Diskussion. Religion — Wirtschaft — Staat. Zur Problematik des Gegenwartsmenschen. Staatliche Strukturwandlungen und die Krisis des Kapitalismus. Kapitaltheoretische Untersuchungen.
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Illusionen und Reinterpretationen einer ordnungspolitischen Integrationsformel. Bern: Haupt, Hayek, Friedrich A. Law, Legislation and Liberty. Heidenreich, Felix. Foucaults Rekonstruktion des Liberalismus und die Rolle des Staates. In Heidenreich, Felix ed. Homann, Karl and Franz Blome-Drees. Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethik. Kant, Immanuel. Die Metaphysik der Sitten. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
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In Wilhelm Korff et al. Shamir, Ronen. Is a certain action then no action anymore, but rather behavior? Today: rational choice theory: no longer a problem: it is believed that if someone opts prospects at expected benefit, it is rational action which is amenable to theoretical treatment. Weber: relies more on ideal types than on a concrete description of reality.
External demarcation: unclear which consequences belong to action and which do not. When you start with that, you tend to include more and more. Internal demarcation: question of motivation. Usually you want to fix the intention to speak of an action. That's why there is a tendency to conceive action attribution-theoretically: action must be attributed by the actor to himself. Problem: what are the motives then, are they real?
One can cite anything that is obvious to oneself. One is prepared. Question: did the Neanderthals have motives already? Log-in and Sign-in. Last edit June It is based on the concept of purposive action and must extend it by two provisions to explain social interaction: a Orientation towards the behaviour of other subjects b The reflexive relationship between the orientations of several interaction participants.
Weber therefore does not start with the social relationship. Habermas III Habermas: "Inofficial version" of Weber's theory of action s this is a position not explicitly represented by Weber, which could, however, be deduced from his texts : here mechanisms of coordination of action are distinguished, depending on whether only interests or also social agreement are taken as a basis. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, hrsg. Weber I M. LuhmannVsAction Theory: it does not clarify the contours of the concept of action.
Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt Many, however, feel an increase in bureaucracy. Symptoms of this are a deterioration s of the feeling of "community". Habermas IV "Privatization": it is emphasized that the modern community has been "privatized" and many relationships have been moved into the context of large formal organizations. Parsons: Bureaucratization does not threaten to flood everything.
ParCh I Ch. HabermasVsWeber: he does not recognize money and power as the communication media that enable the differentiation of subsystems of procedural rational action. IV Which either bundle or replace verbal communication. For example, reputation and power are primitive generators of readiness to follow either rationally through trust in valid knowledge or empirically through incentive through expected reward.
They are the starting point for media education. The communication media can be generalized themselves and thus form control media. Luhmanns Systemtheorie, in der Geld, Macht, Wahrheit usw. Siehe insbesondere C. Baraldi, G. Corsi, E. The actors seek an understanding to coordinate their plans and thus their actions. Language is given a prominent status here. III Problem: there is a danger that social action will be reduced to the interpretive performance of the communication participants, action will be adapted to speech, interaction to conversation. In fact, however, linguistic communication is only the mechanism of action coordination, which brings together the action plans and activities of the ones involved.
III In communicative action, the outcome of the interaction itself is dependent on whether the participants can agree among themselves on an intersubjectively valid assessment of their world-relationships. III Interpretation: Problem: for the understanding of communicative actions we have to separate questions of meaning and validity. The interpretation performance of an observer differs from the coordination efforts of the participants. The observer does not seek a consensus interpretation.
But perhaps only the functions differed here, not the structures of interpretation. In this respect, the negotiation of situation definitions is an essential component. Therefore, perlocutions are not suitable for the analysis of coordination of actions, which are to be explained by illocutionary binding effects. This problem is solved if we understand communicative action as interaction in which all participants coordinate their individual action plans and pursue their illocutionary goals without reservation.
III Only such interactions are communicative actions in which all participants pursue illocutionary goals. Otherwise they fall under strategic action. Understanding a sentence is then defined as knowing what makes that sentence acceptable. Although both reflect the institutional embodiment of rationality complexes, in another respect they are opposite tendencies. Therefore he arrives at his well-known and controversial assessment of the low rationalization potential of these worldviews.
Weber: "The inner prerequisite of this ethics of unconditional world affirmation and adaptation to the world was the unbroken continuity of purely magical religiosity, beginning with the position of the emperor, whose personal qualification was responsible for the good behaviour of spirits, the occurence of rain Needham 2 it is now known that the Chinese between the 1st century B.
It was only in the Renaissance that Europe took the clear lead in this field. With the concept of a concrete world order, the diversity of phenomena is systematically grasped and related to principles. However, the dominant redemption motives that exacerbate the dualism between the world of appearances and principles that transcend the world are missing. III Like the Greek philosophers, the Chinese educational class could not rely on an "academic" life devoted to contemplation and distanced from practice, on a bios theoretikos.
HabermasVsNeedham: I suspect that the Chinese traditions would be put in a different light if they were compared with classical Greek traditions, not primarily from the point of view of ethics but theory. In any case, it is not a matter of salvation paths, as is the case with conviction ethically redemption religions, but of ways of assuring the world. Needham, Wissenschaftlicher Universalismus, Frankfurt The competing form of acquisition or divestiture is the contract that is considered a status change.
The contract adds new relationships to existing relationships. The contract is therefore a source of variations, which presupposes an earlier legal basis with a different origin. The contract is preferably the instrument with which the changes are implemented. He himself cannot form the original and fundamental foundations on which the law is based.
Obedience must also have a moral core. The legal system is in fact a part of a political order with which it would fall if it could not claim legitimacy. The fact that the parties voluntarily enter into an agreement does not imply the binding nature of this agreement. The contract itself is only possible thanks to a regulation of social origin. Durkheim, Lecons de sociologie, Physique des moeurs et du droit. Paris , S. London Durkheim I E. This does not mean a reduction to formal conditions of moral and practical justification of legal norms, but compliance with procedural rules in jurisdiction, application of law and legislation.
Habermas III Legitimacy is then based "on the belief in the legality of established orders and the right of instruction of those appointed by them to exercise power". There is no way out of this circularity. This means a the preparation of an abstract concept of the world b the differentiation of a purely ethical attitude in which the actor can follow and criticize norms c the formation of a universalistic and individualistic concept of persons with the correlates of conscience, moral accountability, autonomy, guilt, etc. The reverent attachment to traditionally guaranteed concrete orders of life can thus be overcome in favour of a free orientation towards general principles.
Habermas III Cognitive dimension: here, the disenchanting of things and events is accompanied by a demythologization of the knowledge of the existing. All the more reason for individuals to systematize their relationships with the world, this time under the abstract aspects of a cosmological-metaphysical order whose laws govern all phenomena without exception. This means a the preparation of a formal world concept for the existing as a whole with universals for the legal, space-time context of entities in general, 1 b the differentiation of a purely theoretical attitude out of touch with practice , c the formation of an epistemic ego in general, which, free of affects, worldly interests, prejudices, etc.
It is therefore not sufficiently clear that there is still another step between the results of world view rationalization and that world understanding that is "modern" in a specific sense. First, however, a generalization of the level of learning, which has been achieved with the terminology of religious-metaphysical worldviews, is required. Weber relates this to the fact that the structures of consciousness, differentiated into independent cultural value spheres, are embodied in correspondingly antagonistic orders of life. Parson's differing position, however, results deductively from his description of the modernization process.
HabermasVsWeber: the thesis owes its plausibility solely to the ambiguous use of the term "rationalization". Its meaning shifts, depending on the context, from the rationality of action to the rationality of the system. On the one hand it is about the perspective of members, on the other hand about the image of a rationally working machine. HabermasVsWeber: the talk of the living machine is metaphorical. However, Weber intuitively anticipated the distinction between system and purpose rationality. The force that can be felt through feelings of obligation is not only compatible with the autonomy of action, but in some ways even constitutes it.
This force is no longer perceived as external violence but from within by penetrating the motives. Habermas: this reflects the double character of freedom, which is constituted by the personal recognition of a connection to superpersonal orders.
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Rather, he is convinced that modern societies have brought about an incomparable increase in freedom for the mass of the population. Weber uses this term synonymously with procedural rationality. Habermas III HorkheimerVsWeber: In contrast, Horkheimer emphasizes the loss of rationality that occurs to the extent that actions can only be judged, planned and justified under cognitive aspects.
Habermas: The irony is that reason, which according to Kant refers to the capacity of ideas and includes practical reason and judgement, is identified with what Kant distinguishes from it, namely with the activity of the mind. Horkheimer, Zur Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft, Frankfurt , p. The internalization of moral corresponds to a complementary transformation of the law into an externally imposed, state-authorized power based on the state sanction apparatus.
The quasi automatic enforceability of the fulfilment of legal claims Habermas IV is to guarantee obedience. The legal system is in fact part of a political order with which it would fall if it could not claim legitimacy. Cosmological, religious and metaphysical worldviews are structured in such a way that the internal difference between theoretical and practical reason cannot yet come into effect. Habermas III The autonomisation of law and moral leads to formal law and to profane ethics of conviction and responsibility.
Of course, this autonomization is still in the making even within religious systems of interpretation. This leads to the dichotomization between a search for salvation, which is oriented towards inner salvation goods and means of salvation, and the realization of an outer, objectified world. Weber shows how ethics of conviction approaches develop from this religiousness of conviction.
The availability of post-traditional legal concepts is not yet identical with the enforcement of a modern legal system. Only on the basis of rational natural law can legal matters be reconstructed in basic concepts of formal law in such a way that legal institutions can be created that formally satisfy universalist principles. These must regulate private commercial transactions between the owners of goods and the complementary activities of the public administration. HabermasVsWeber: this does not show the parallelism of these two processes clearly enough.
The dialectical explanation of the conflicting developments of the development of science and religion cannot be applied to the development of law, since it appears from the outset in a secularized form. Habermas: Weber reinterprets modern law in such a way that it is separated from the evaluative value sphere.
Habermas III HabermasVsWeber: Weber empirically reinterprets the problem of legitimacy and decouples the political system from forms of moral-practical rationality; he also cuts the formation of political will back to processes of power acquisition and power competition.
To the extent that this is replaced by success-oriented, purpose-oriented action, the problem arises as to how these new scopes can in turn be legitimate, i. Rational social action takes the place of conventional community action. Habermas III Only the procedure of coming into being justifies the assumption that a normative agreement is rationally motivated. Only within normatively defined limits may legal entities act rationally without regard to conventions.
HabermasVsWeber: he fluctuates here between discursive agreement and arbitrary statute. It protects their private inclinations within sanctioned boundaries. Not only bad convictions, but also actions that deviate from the norm are sanctioned, assuming accountability. The arbitrary freedom of legal entities in a morally neutralized area of private actions with legal consequences is assumed. Private law transactions can therefore be regulated negatively by restricting authorisations that are recognised in principle instead of a positive regulation of concrete obligations and material bids.
Anything that is not prohibited by law is permitted in this area. Habermas: the system functionality corresponding to these characteristics results from legal structures in which procedural rational action can become general. It does not explain how these legal structures themselves are possible. Habermas III Rather, the form of modern law is explained by the post-traditional structures of consciousness it embodies. HabermasVsWeber: he would have to understand the modern legal system as an order of life, which is assigned to the moral-practical way of life.
But Weber's attempt to view the rationalization of law exclusively from the point of view of rationality of purpose contradicts this. Habermas: only at a post-conventional level does the idea of the fundamental critiqueability and need for justification of legal norms emerge. This requires practical justification. The moral-free sphere of law refers to a moral based on principles. The achievement of making something positive is to shift justification problems, i. This justification, which has become structurally necessary, is expressed in the catalogue of fundamental rights contained in the civil constitutions alongside the principle of popular sovereignty.
Nor does he sufficiently distinguish between structural and content-related aspects in rational natural law and can therefore equate "nature" and "reason" with value contents, from which modern law, in the strict sense, is detached as an instrument for asserting any values and interests. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Ed. Ibid p. Weber emphasizes above all the structural characteristics that are connected with the formalism of a technically systematized law and with the positivity of set norms characteristics: positivity, legality and formality.
HabermasVsWeber: he neglects the moment of need for justification. In doing so, he excludes the very rational ideas that arose with the right of reason in the 17th century and have since been characteristic, if not for all legal norms, then nevertheless for the legal system as a whole, especially for the public-law foundations of legal rule. Thus, all moral and legal relations Question: how can two decisions originating from two different subjects have a greater binding force, simply because they are identical?
And these only apply Habermas IV as legitimate because they express a general interest. Paris , p. Durkheim p. Weber: The transition from an agreed on to an imposed order is smooth. This is already apparent from the logical analysis of the concepts of legitimacy and legality. How did Weber come to this?
I only find one argument that does not hold up either: that everyday techniques are usually no longer understood in their inner reasons. Weber points this out. Ultimately, however, rational foundations of the legal system are again assumed. Belief in legality is not an independent type of legitimacy. Habermas III Habermas: the extension of the legitimation paths does not mean, however, that the belief in legality could replace the belief in the legitimation of the legal system as a whole. But instead of welcoming contrary tendencies, Weber sees them as a danger to the formal qualities of the law.
Weber, Methodologische Schriften, hrsg. Schluchter following H. Heller introduces "legal principles" which are intended to act as a bridge between positive law and the foundations of an ethics of responsibility , p. HabermasVsSchluchter: the status of these principles remains unclear. Within Max Weber's system they are a foreign element. Based on Weber's analysis, two problems are encountered on the threshold of modernity: 1. Religious asceticism must first penetrate the non-religious areas of life in order to subject profane actions to the maxims of ethics of conviction.
Weber identifies this process with the emergence of Protestant professional ethics. In the emergence of modern science, the decoupling of the theory from practical experience must be overcome. This happened in the form of experimental natural sciences.
It is only delivered in modern societies. This process means the modernisation of society. In this way, he prevents exactly the distinctions that we have to make if we want to grasp the pathologies occurring in modernism. Krohn, Die neue Wissenschaft der Renaissance, in: G. Daele, W. Krohn, Experimentelle Philosophie, Frankfurt, , S. Gumbrecht, R.